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Abstract 
The remote anonymous trusted authentication of M2M equipments is a key problem in Internet of Things system. 
The Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol had been adopted by TCG to implement the attestation of the 
trusted platform. Limited by the deficient computing and storing resources of most embedded devices, a new 
improved DAA (I-DAA) scheme is proposed to be applied in M2M networks. The proposed I-DAA scheme not only 
retains the security of the legacy DAA, but also greatly reduces the computational complexity, which makes it more 
suitable for M2M networks. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction
M2M (Machine to Machine) networks are new research hotspot in Internet of Things system [1]. The
security requirements in M2M systems are urgent to be solved. Thus, it is important to introduce the 
trusted computing framework into M2M networks. The core part of a trusted computing system is Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM).which is a security chip with physical tamper preventing, encryption, decryption, 
and other functions. One of the basic questions related to TPM is the attestation of TPM. In order to 
protect the privacy of TPM and the information integrity, TCG proposed a solution called Privacy CA 
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scheme [2] in TPM standard v1.1 and DAA (Direct Anonymous Attestation) scheme [3] in TPM standard 
v1.2. 
Although the Privacy CA scheme is simple, it has two apparent weaknesses [4]. To solve these two 
problems, the DAA scheme is proposed. But the traditional DAA scheme includes lots of zero-knowledge 
proof and complex calculation, which make it not suitable for embedded devices, such as M2M 
equipment, cell phones, etc. A lot of research has been done to improve the DAA schemes [5], [6], [7]. [8], [9].
We propose a new Improved DAA (I-DAA) scheme in this paper. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief analysis of these existing schemes.  
We describe the related mathematical fundamentals needed in Section 3 and the I-DAA scheme will be 
described in Section 4. In Section 5, security proofs are presented. Efficiency analysis and comparisons 
are described in Section 6 and conclusions are given in Section 7.  
2 Existing ECC-DAA schemes  
The existing schemes are as follows: 
1) The BCL-DAA scheme [7], [8], a DAA scheme that introduced bilinear map into the basic DAA 
scheme to replace the RSA mechanism.  
2) The CMS-DAA [9] scheme that uses asymmetric bilinear map instead of symmetric bilinear.  
3) The ABP-DAA scheme [4]. It pointed out that if DDH problem in   is easy, we can protect the 
privacy of TPM through blinding 1fP .
4) The C-DAA scheme  [5], which is by far the most efficient scheme. This scheme benefits from an 
efficient batch proof.
The ABP-DAA scheme simplifies much computational complexity, but it still has several deficiencies to 
be fixed. 
• After receiving the credential (A, B, C), TPM or Host does not check whether it is legal, which reduces 
the computing complexity at the cost of decreasing the security level. 
• The ABP-DAA scheme considers that DDH assumption in 1G +  is easy, so TPM participates in 
computing C in the credential, )fxy P
∼
+ , But we generally consider 
the assumption is difficult.  
1 1
1( )C k C k x fxy K
− −
= = + ( x=
• At the end of the ABP-DAA scheme, it points out that Issuer and Verifier may collude. If TPM 
provides 1fP  to Issuer, then Issuer can obtain privacy information by computing 
equation 1 1 . Thus, in the ABP-DAA scheme, TPM provides 1kfP  instead of 1( ,e B ) ( , )
f
i ifP e B P= fP ,
but Issuer can obtain the privacy information by computing the equation f ,
which means collusion can still succeed. 
1 1, )kP( , ) (i ie B e B=fkP
• In the whole scheme, no random number is added, which can not prevent replay attack. 
• Since Base name is not used, it has no property of user-controlled-traceability, which decreases the 
flexibility of the scheme. 
3 Pre-knowledge 
3.1 Bilinear mapping [4] 
1 , 2 are two additive cyclic groups. 3G × is a multiplicative cyclic group, and order of the three 
groups is . A map , is called bilinear map if it meets the following conditions: 
G + G +
q 1 2:e G G G+ +× →
, ,
3×
• Bilinear: For any 1 2 1P P P G +∈ , 2Q G +∈ , the two equations )
 hold, where , qa b Z∈ .
1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( ,e P P Q e P Q e P Q+ =
( , ) ( ,e aP bQ e P Q= )ab
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• Non-degradation: There exists 1 1 2 2,P G P G+∈ ∈ + , the equation 1 2 can be satisfied. 1 is the 
identity of G .
( , ) 1e P P ≠
3×
• Computability: For any 1 1P G +∈ , 2 2P G +∈ , efficient algorithm to calculate 1 2( , )e P P  exists.  
3.2 Difficulty question assumptions [4]
For ,, , , qa b c d Z∈ 1P G +∈ or 2P G +∈ , 1 1P G +∈ , 2 2P G +∈ .
Assumption 1: Discrete Logarithm (DL). It is impossible to obtain  through aP .a
Assumption 2: Computing Diffie-Hellman (CDH). It is impossible to obtain  through .abP ,aP bP
Assumption 3: Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH). It is impossible to distinguish the two triples 
 and .( , , )aP bP abP ( , , )aP bP cP
Assumption 4: Cooperative computing Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH). It is impossible obtain through 
through
1abP
1abP 1 2,aP bP
4 I-DAA (Improved -DAA) scheme 
The scheme in this paper is based on the M2M network, so the roles of issuer and verifier can be 
played by one entity, thus, collusion attack is not considered in our scheme. For convenience we still 
consider that the two roles are played by different entity. Generally, the protocol has four processes: Setup, 
Join, Sign, and Verify. 
4.1 Parameter settings (Setup) 
 For bilinear map: , , .1 2:e G G G+ +× → 3× 1 1G P+ =< > 2 2G P+ =< > 1P  / 2P is the generator of / .
Choose
1G + 2G +
, qx y F∈ , calculate . are hash functions and they are the 
same as in reference [5].We let
2 2yP 1 2, ,H H,X xP Y= = 3 4 5, ,H H H
{ }*0,1  and { }0,1 t
1 1,
denote the set of binary strings of arbitrary length and 
length t respectively.  E(k1, m) denotes that we encrypt m with k1, and D(k2, m) denotes that we decrypt m 
with k2 . ( ,  are EK of TPM.)pk sk A P B yP= =
, )
.  are 
public parameters, and private ones are ( ,
1 2 3 4, , , ,H H H H5 1, ,P P2 )( , , ,pk X Y A, , qB F , H
x y sk .
4.2 Application for DAA credential（Join）
{0,1}tIn ∈
( , )IM E pk n=M
M
D fB=
( , )ID n ( , )ID n
In
if RougeList∈
iD f B=
1 1 1( ) ( )C x A D xP fxyP x fxy P= + = + = +
( , , )A B C
?
2e( , ) ( , )A D X e C P+ =
( , , )A B C
D fB=
( , )In D sk M=
qf F∈
Figure 1. Join (application for DAA credential) 
( , , )A B C is the DAA credential. Since ,A B are both public parameters, it is not necessary to verify 
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them. is the only parameter that needs to be checked. Thus, the scheme saves the computational 
complexity of two bilinear maps for Host. 
C
4.3 Signature based on DAA credential (Sign) 
The process involves TPM, Host, and Verifier. It is shown in Figure 2. 
TPM Host Verifier
}{0,1 tvn ∈
vn
1, elsebsn J G +=⊥ ←If 
3 ( )J H bsn← ql ←  
compute , , ,R lA S lB T lC G lD= = = =
4 ( || || || || )VE H R S T G n=
, ,J r E
( , , , )Tm n J a ( , , , , , , , )V Tm n n R S J T Gσ =
choose                 
compute Z rS=
}{0,1 tTn ← qr∈ 
5 ( || || || || ( ))Tm H J n E Z msg PCR=
(mod )a r fm q= +
Figure 2. Sign (signature based on DAA credential) 
In this process, we still use random numbers to prevent replay attack. computed by Host, are 
only related to parameters of the credential. Thus, they can be computed in advance.  
, , ,R S T G
4.4 Verify the signature (Verify) 
This process only involves the Verify, and it is shown in Figure 3. 
4' ( || || || || )VE H R S T G n=
5' ( || || ' || ' || ( ))Im H J n E Z msg PCR=
'G f S=
?
2( , ) ( , )e R G X e T P+ =
?
'm m=
?
2( , ) ( , )e R Y e S P=
1( )bsn J H bsn≠⊥ ≠且
'f RougList∀ ∈
=aZ' S-Gm
Figure.3. Verify (verify the signature) 
Detection of Rogue List in this paper is the same as in the C-DAA scheme, it verifie )  instead 
) [10], resulting in reducing the computing workload of TPM. When we verify the two 
equations , and . We can draw the method in the C-DAA [5]
scheme. Instead of verifying the two pairing equations, we can verify whether the equation 
 holds. The method improves 
verifications of a blinded C-L signature by ~40%. 
s
of 
)
2
( ,G S
( ,J K
] ,R
2( , ) ( ,e R G X e T P+ =
1 1 2([ ] , ) ([e e S P e e• − •
( , )e R Y
2 ), )G X+
2( , )e S P=
([ ] ,e e T• − 2( ]( ) 1R P =[ )e e Y
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5 Correctness and Security analysis of I-DAA scheme 
The shortcomings in the ABP-DAA are all fixed in this paper. The I-DAA scheme makes definite 
distribution of computing workload between TPM and Host. After getting credential ( , , )A B C , Host 
verifies parameter C , completing a two-way authentication. Random numbers prevent replay attack, while 
the use of base name increases flexibility. 
5.1 Correctness 
Correctness of this scheme lies on whether the equations, , ,
hold. According to properties of bilinear map
2( , ) ( ,e A D X e C P+ =
( , )e A D X e+ =
( , ) ( , )e R Y e lA yP e l= =
) 2( , ) ( , )e R Y e S P=
1 2( , )P fB xP+ =
( , ) ( , )B P e S P=
2( , ) ( ,e R G X e T P+ =
( , ) ( , )e P xP e fyP xP
)
21 2 1 2 1 1 2 2( , ) ( , )e xP fxyP P e C P= + =
1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ,e R G X e lA lD X e lP xP e lfyP xP+ = + =
, ,
, so the three 
equations are true. 
2 2
1 1 2 2( , ) ( , )xP lfxyP P e T P= + =) le
5.2 Security analysis and relevance detection 
Theorem: On the condition that if TPM does not leak its f , this I-DAA scheme is secure. 
Proof: Suppose that there is an adversary, one can forge DAA credential , , 'A B C , (A, B are public 
parameters) and 'D . We assume that, 1 1' , 'C P Dα Pβ= =
1 2 1 2, ) ( ' , )xP e l P Pβ α=
.Then one can calculate
, ' , where . Obviously, one can meet the equation e R .
For , namely
' ,R l A=
2( , )e S P
'
1 2( , )
' ,S l B=
(e R
' 'T l C=
,G X+ =
'G l D
, )P
=
) (e T
' ql Z∈
'l P+
( , )Y =
) '
2 1( 'e l P= (11 2( , ) xl lP Pe P P eβ α+ = ,
so (1 )xβ α=+ , that means we can calculate  , with1(1 )C xPβ= + 1, 2D P X xP=
, ' rS=
2 )P
β
, ' rG=
)X+ =
=
S
( ,e T
, but this is a co-
CDH problem mentioned above. For middlemen attack, suppose that the attacker captures legal 
signature . One can then recalculate R  by choosing .
Although it satisfies the equations e R  and e R , it cannot get the right 
 without knowing
, , ,R T G S ' , 'rR T rT= =
2( , )e S P ( ,G
G qr Z∈
( , )Y =
a f . Namely it cannot pass the equation Z aS mG= − . In other words, the Man-in–
the-Middle attack cannot succeed. 
Due to the use of base name, user-controlled-traceability is feasible. If TPM is allowed to be traced, it 
will use the same base name in the verification process each time and verifier can link TPM by the 
same J each time. Otherwise TPM can let base name be⊥ .
6 Efficiency analysis  
The I-DAA scheme is a modification of existing schemes, especially the ABP-DAA and C-DAA 
schemes. Thus, here we only list computing complexity of the three. In the lists, computation of 
asymmetric encryption, asymmetric decryption, and hash functions are not included, since they are 
relatively easy to compute compared with bilinear map. We denote the computation and parameters 
included in the scheme as following: For bilinear map 1 2:e G G G+ +× → 3×
1G + : Computation in or . For example, for1G + 2G + 1P G∈ aP+
,
, compute .
2G1+ : Computation in or . For example, for1G + 2+ 1G P Q G∈ + , compute aP .bQ+
G 3P G ×∈ , compute
a
× : Computation in . For example, for3×G P .
2G× : Computation in G . For example, for ,P Q∈3× 3G × , compute
a bP Q .
P : Computation of bilinear map. For 1 1P G ,+∈ 2 2P G∈ + , compute .1 2)P( ,e P
n f: The number of TPM which has leaked its .
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1 1
/ 2G G
+ +
Table 1 Comparison of computational cost    
operation party computation  of ABP-DAA 
 scheme 1*
computation of C-DAA 
 scheme2* 
computation of I-DAA 
scheme 
Apply for DAA 
credential(Join)
TPM 3G
+
3G
+
G
+
4 P 2Host 0 P
Issuer 2 nG G
+ +
+
22 2G G
+ +
+
2G nG
+ +
+
4 G
+ 1/ 2G G+ + G+
4 G
+
4 G
+
2 5G nG P
× +
+ +
2 4G nG P
+ +
+ +
2 4G nG P
+ +
+ +
Sign on the 
credential(Sign) 
TPM 
Host 0
Verify the 
signature(Verify) 
Verifier 
According to the comparison, we can see that the biggest advantage of the I-DAA scheme proposed in 
this paper is that it further reduces computing complexity of TPM. As we know, resources of TPM are 
much more valuable than those of Host and Verifier, 
7 conclusions 
The I-DAA scheme proposed in this paper follows the processes and framework that most existing 
DAA schemes have, and it can be considered as a modification of these existing ECC-DAA schemes. It is 
based on the M2M network, and it simplifies computing complexity but keeps high security level. Thus, it 
is more suitable for embedded devices and M2M networks. 
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